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Producing Literacy and Civil Society: The Case of Senegal
BJORN HARALD NORDTVEIT
Donor and financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and others, often promote market-based solutions for
the delivery of public services in developing countries. This article examines
the use of such market approaches by the World Bank to hire for-profit and
nonprofit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to implement a Women’s
Literacy Project (WLP) in Senegal. This particular project has been touted
as one of the “best” of the large literacy projects in Senegal, and it has been
extended as a model by the World Bank in other West African countries,
including Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger, and The Gambia.
Several recent studies have argued favorably for strong international sup-
port to set up local educational policies and economic frameworks (e.g.,
Resnik 2006). By examining the WLP, I seek to inform the debate on the
role of international organizations, as well as for-profit and nonprofit non-
governmental organizations, as producers of women’s literacy and builders
of civil society. Prior to presenting the case study, I summarize the discourses
related to the neoliberal economic rationale, the role of civil society orga-
nizations, and gender and literacy.
Discourses
The increase of the use of NGOs for educational service delivery in Africa
is a recent phenomenon and is associated with the conservative agendas of
Ronald Reagan (in the United States) and Margaret Thatcher (in Britain)
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The main facets of the Reagan/Thatcher
policies are based on Friedrich Hayek’s economic thought and focus on the
restriction of government and the enhancement of individual freedom. This
conservative ideology has influenced the development discourse, and its ef-
fects can be seen not only in developing countries’ economic strategies but
also on their civil societies, literacy, and gender policies.
The Economic Rationale
Many funding agencies, among which the World Bank features promi-
nently, have adopted a neoliberal discourse as a foundation of their devel-
opment agenda and often consider governments of developing countries as
obstacles to economic growth. Development, in this context, is almost syn-
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onymous with economic growth, and both the World Bank and the IMF
promote the idea that market liberalization and the reduction of the public
sector produce economic growth and, thereby, development. In this agenda
for development, known as the “Washington consensus,” the private sector
is considered to be a more effective and efficient means for providing social
services.1
The World Bank and other agencies use various methods for the transfer
of responsibilities from the public to the private sector. The use of NGOs
instead of state agencies to implement literacy services can be seen as a
method to circumvent government bottlenecks by the purchase of services
from the private sector. Here, the government must be seen in a double
light: on the one hand, as a manager of World Bank loans and, on the other,
as a purchaser of NGO services. According to the proponents of the use of
NGO implementation, such partnerships between public and private sectors
are employed for three main reasons: (i) the government (sometimes
through pressure from international organizations) wishes to concentrate on
certain key sectors and uses nongovernmental providers to implement ser-
vices for which the latter have a comparative advantage and where risks can
be shared; (ii) in a number of countries public social services are inefficient
and run-down due to lack of human and material resources, and donors
believe that, instead of reequipping government institutions, private providers
can be more cost-effective; and (iii) many stakeholders view private provider-
implemented programs as less corrupt than traditional public delivery (Har-
per 2000). The stated objective is that in all three cases, through the use of
NGO implementation of services, one may achieve a quicker pace of imple-
mentation, higher disbursement rates, and thereby a greater impact than
government-planned and executed projects.
Reliable international data on the effect of these market-based solutions
are scarce. A World Bank review of skills development in sub-Saharan Africa
(including 14 thematic studies that covered 20 country reviews and 70 case
studies) did not give any clear indication of how well the public sector per-
formed in comparison to the private sector. Generally, the World Bank com-
plained about the “appealingly weak statistical base on nongovernment schools
and enrollments. . . . Relevant information on both the quality and the stability
of nongovernmental training institutions is clearly lacking” ( Johanson and
Adams 2004, 106). Even strong advocates for the use of NGOs in an attempt
to reduce costs and enhance effectiveness agree that such an approach may
lead to flawed results. For example (as was the case in Senegal), providers
may substitute short courses for expensive long-term teacher training semi-
1 The term “Washington consensus” was first used by a World Bank economist, John Williamson,
in an attempt to “distill which of the policy initiatives that had emanated from Washington during the
years of conservative ideology had won inclusion in the intellectual mainstream, rather than being cast
aside once Ronald Reagan was no longer on the public scene” (Williamson 2000, 254).
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nars. In such situations, cost-cutting incentives may lead to ineffective out-
comes: “ironically, the government sometimes becomes the efficient producer
precisely because its employees are not motivated to find ways of holding
costs down” (Schleifer 1998, 11).
The World Bank has promoted the use of a “short route of accountability”
to tackle these problems. The “short route,” in which the provider is directly
accountable to the recipients of services, contrasts with the “long route” in
which policy makers hold providers accountable: “When the relationships
along this long route break down, service delivery fails (absentee teachers,
leaking water pipes) and human development outcomes are poor. . . . Given
the weaknesses in the long route of accountability, service outcomes [are]
improved by strengthening the short route—by increasing the client’s power
over providers” (World Bank 2003, 6). The strengthening of the short route
can be made through (i) making it possible for the clients (here, the learners)
to switch suppliers; (ii) reputation building among providers; and (iii) where
competition is weak, consumer choice is ineffective, and where reputational
mechanisms are also weak, one can make use of nonprofit organizations as
providers (Schleifer 1998).
In economic theory, the validity of these claims is relative to the accuracy
of assumptions regarding the ease of service providers’ access to the market
and the ready and inexpensive availability of relevant contract information:
“the first assumption speaks directly to the existence of sustainable compe-
tition, and the second pertains to the ability to obtain low-cost and effective
contract enforcement. To the extent that these conditions hold, contracting
in a market-oriented society can typically be expected to be more efficient
and effective than the work done by public employees” (Sclar 2000, 9). For
implementation of services of most NGOs, the second assumption (access to
information) has proved the most challenging. Asymmetric information prob-
lems, in which the government does not know how the provider performs,
have in many cases made it necessary to set up costly (and often flawed)
monitoring and evaluation systems to ensure contract compliance or have
resulted in ineffective and unregulated service provision. Monitoring expenses
and other variable transaction costs can be particularly heavy when using private
implementation of services (Schleifer 1998; Sclar 2000; Furubotn and Richter
2003). M. Edwards and D. Hulme (1998, 8), in reviewing different studies on
NGO implementation, found that “there is no empirical study that demon-
strates a general case that NGO provision is ‘cheaper’ than public provision.”
The economic rationale for the use of NGOs as service providers, therefore,
is at best contested, even from a neoclassical economic point of view.
Civil Society
Nongovernmental organizations and, more broadly, civil society associa-
tions have become new partners to the government and donor organizations
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for delivery of education and other social services. Often, the terms “NGOs”
and “civil society” are employed interchangeably. In many recent Western
definitions of the term, civil society associations are understood as institutions
that are independent of the economy and the state. For example, for Jean
L. Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992, ix), civil society is a “sphere of social
interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate
sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary
associations), social movements, and forms of public communication.”
In Senegal and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, civil society organizations
are often publicly registered as Economic Interest Groups (or GIE: Groupe-
ment d’Inte´reˆt Economique) with a clear for-profit mandate. The current
expansion of associations in West Africa is often constituted through assis-
tance from government-financed programs, such as the Women’s Literacy
Project (Thiane´ 1996). Using a definition of civil society as being independent
of the spheres of the state and of the economy, one can debate whether such
associations, whose main purpose is to capture finance from the state, should
be included in the definition of civil society. Similarly, one can question to
which extent NGOs are really nongovernmental when they receive most or
all of their funding from government agencies. However, the notion of an
independent civil society may seem too limiting when considering the mul-
titude of associations that are less known to Western societies and that belong
to daily life in Africa. For example, “in West Africa the following types of
movements can be distinguished: [a] movements linked to cultural institu-
tions, such as secret societies, prophets, diviners, sorcery, etc.; [b] religious
revival movements and sects, Islamic fundamentalist movements; [c] new
ethnic movements; [d] cultural, youth, and development associations, social
movements” ( Jacob and Lavigne 1994, 70). Based on the list provided, as-
sociations in Africa can be roughly divided into three groups: traditional
mutual help groups (women’s village associations, economic networks called
tontines, etc.); religious groups; and new, development-related associations
that have as their aim the capturing of external capital for the purpose of
setting up development activities.2 The latter are most often for profit and
can be differentiated from private businesses only through their (stated)
development goals rather than (stated) commercial or industrial objectives.
In this article, I have used a Senegalese and project-related understanding
of civil society, considering it as a sphere of social interactions that is linked
to political and economic interests and composed, above all, of the sphere
of associations, especially voluntary associations such as traditional grassroots
organizations (both for-profit and nonprofit), faith-based groups, and de-
velopment-related associations.
Civil society was at first not an item on the neoliberal agenda, which
2 A tontine in the Senegalese context most often takes the form of an indigenous microfinance
group.
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preferred to speak in terms of individuals. As Margaret Thatcher said in a
famous interview with the magazine Woman’s Own (1987), “you know, there
is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there
are families. And no government can do anything except through people,
and people must look to themselves first” (Thatcher 2002, 426). During Bill
Clinton’s and Tony Blair’s administrations, the search for an alternative way
between capitalism and socialism became the topic of Anthony Giddens’s
influential “Third Way” (1999). As adviser to Tony Blair, Giddens was defining
a so-called socially responsible capitalism where “civil society is an interme-
diary sphere serving to complement rather than to replace the state” and
where it “offers a third route to welfare provision, which is neither private
nor state” (Howell and Pearce 2001, 67). From the 1980s, the World Bank
and other development agencies began to use NGOs in the implementation
of its social programs. Recently, “partnership” with civil society has become
a new buzzword in the debate on democracy and development and is now
largely being adopted into the neoliberal discourse. In the 1990s, especially
through the influence of Joseph Stiglitz and James Wolfensohn, the World
Bank actively began to advocate policies that resulted in the creation of civil
society (Todaro and Smith 2003).
Criticisms from different viewpoints contended that World Bank and
IMF’s structural adjustments programs had not gained conclusive results and
lacked political and popular support. To overcome these problems, donors
turned gradually toward civil society, “which by the late 1980s had already
been constructed as a benign arena in contrast to the malign state. Housed
within civil society was a potential agency in the form of NGOs and, later,
other non-state groups” (Howell and Pearce 2001, 41). In this climate, NGOs
were gradually conceived of as alternative deliverers of social services and
welfare. In the 1990s, development programs not only began using NGOs
but also set up programs that aimed to strengthen or even to create various
forms of civil society associations. By the year 2000, key financial development
institutions, especially the World Bank, began promoting NGOs as a main
partner in the business of development.
This tendency has been criticized for different reasons. Edwards and
Hulme (1998, 6) found that “much of the case for emphasizing the role of
NGOs/GROs [grassroots organizations] rests on ideological grounds rather
than empirical verification” and contended that the increasing use of such
organizations
1. encourages NGOs to become providers of social and economic ser-
vices on a much larger scale than thitherto, even though their long-
term comparative advantage in this field is doubtful;
2. compromises the performance of NGOs and GROs in other areas of
development activity such as institutional development and advocacy;
3. weakens the legitimacy of NGOs and GROs as independent actors in
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society;
4. distorts the accountability of NGOs and GROs away from grassroots
and internal constituencies, and overemphasizes short-term, quanti-
tative outputs. (Edwards and Hulme 1998, 8)
Generally, it has been argued that the NGOs shift from being a partner
and advocacy organization to becoming a contractor or a temporary worker,
“implementing the funder’s agenda in the community . . . easily discarded
as circumstances change, and consequently limited in their ability to chal-
lenge development practice” (Klees 1998, 50). The notion of such a shift
may take for granted that NGOs are legitimate and independent actors in
society and that the World Bank and other donors would subvert their primary
mandate as advocates for grassroots’ level constituencies. However, NGOs
constitute a heterogeneous set of organizations ranging from large inter-
national donor associations to small local groups operating on very limited
budgets (Ginsburg 1998). For example, in West Africa it would be difficult
to perceive NGOs and GROs as independent actors without connections to
the economy or to the state.
Ostensibly, Senegal’s Women’s Literacy Project, which was later to become
a model for other, similar literacy programs in other countries in Africa,
corresponded to both a neoliberal economic vision of limited state involve-
ment in service delivery and to a vision of strengthening and using civil society
to deliver such programs. The idea was that the NGOs would help the state
and offer more effective literacy courses, build a stronger civil society, and
at the same time correct educational gender disparities.
Gender
The debate on women’s role in development is of relatively recent origin.
In particular, the 1970 pioneering study of cash cropping in Africa by the
Danish economist Ester Boserup boosted interest in the area (Boserup 1989).
This study was followed by a great number of studies from 1978 onward on
women’s role in development. These studies were partly stimulated by a 1975
conference in New Mexico City, in which the United Nations inaugurated
the Women’s Decade. A UN organization, the UN Development Fund for
Women (UNIFEM), was created in 1976 as a result of the conference. A Mid-
Decade Conference took place in Copenhagen in 1980, for which a collection
of worldwide statistical information on women’s living conditions was pre-
pared. Most of the initiatives related to these conferences underlined the
fact that women were active contributors to development and important to
economic growth. In doing so, it was claimed that investment in women was
economically cost-effective and would lead to development. In short, “it fo-
cused on what women did for development, rather than what it did for them”
(Heward and Bunwaree 1999, 1).
The effort to make women key actors in development efforts, labeled
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Women in Development, or WID, was readily adopted by the donor com-
munity, and many WID projects were created, especially in the domain of
income-generating activities. Generally, these projects were aimed at women
exclusively. They were later criticized insomuch as they often added to the
already heavy workload of women and also tended to classify women as in-
ferior or “vulnerable.” The notion of “gender and development” (GAD)
gained momentum in the 1980s, rejecting WID for its focus on “Women’s
development . . . as a logistical problem, rather than something requiring
a fundamental reassessment of gender relations and ideology” (Marchand
and Parpart 1995, 13). In other words, the WID movement focused on ap-
proaches that arguably would increase women’s effectiveness at work through
policies related to health, education, and training.
According to GAD theories, the place of women in the community is
linked to a female sphere and to female activities that are distinct from the
men’s sphere. These activities and relationships need to be analyzed both as
they relate to development activities and also how they are affected by them.
However, it is argued that women and development must not be seen as a
united, single “issue.” It is important to stress the heterogeneity of women
and their interests, which lead to heterogeneity in their relations to devel-
opment (Heward and Bunwaree 1999). Hence, proponents of the GAD move-
ment insisted that development work should be based on a critical analysis
of the relationship between gender and society and promote a fundamental
social transformation of patriarchal power structures. In this context, the
GAD movement addresses the inequity of women’s representation in admin-
istrative bodies in development countries. The challenge of GAD to traditional
patriarchal power structures has made the approach less attractive for main-
stream development and donor agencies, such as the World Bank (Marchand
and Parpart 1995).
The GAD movement rarely criticized the Western model of development
since it was rooted in the very same Western concepts. Other feminist move-
ments developed at the same time as GAD, offering a different vision of
women and development. Development Alternatives with Women for a New
Era (DAWN) was one such movement, which was created in 1984 and which
set up networks of women scholars and activists from developing countries.
These networks engaged in feminist research and were committed to eco-
nomic and gender justice as well as democracy. DAWN scholars not only
critiqued development at a micro level (proposing gender projects, etc.) but
were interested in the macro level, proposing alternative paths to develop-
ment as compared to Western modernization views: “Under this theme [Po-
litical Economy of Globalisation], DAWN monitors and analyzes the systematic
processes of economic globalisation and trade liberalisation and their impact
on poor women of the South, working closely with other global development
networks for greater accountability and radical restructuring of institutions like
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the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations system
and (from 1999) the World Trade Organisation” (DAWN 2005).
Analysis of the World Bank and IMF programs maintain that in many
cases the neoliberal program changed the traditional patterns of family in-
come, in which the men were responsible for cash income; they also changed
women’s access to services, especially through the changes brought about by
World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs (SAPs). The first point
is demonstrated by the globalization of the labor market: “as the process of
expansion of capitalism continued, capital proved gender-blind and the
cheap, efficient labour of women was found to be preferable to that of men”
(Afshar and Barrientos 1999, 4). The second point is that introduction of
SAPs is characterized by changes in service delivery that, it is argued, have
negatively affected women (Stromquist and Monkman 2000). In particular,
the SAPs have been criticized in regard to their push for the state’s withdrawal
from the provision of many social services. From a social welfare perspective,
it is contended that neoliberal policies have brought many of women’s eco-
nomic and political gains to a standstill.
Nonformal Basic Education and Literacy
The term “nonformal education” (NFE) became widely used in the 1970s
development discourse, characterizing “any organized, systematic, educa-
tional activity carried on outside the framework of the formal system to pro-
vide selected types of learning to particular subgroups of the population,
adults as well as children” (Coombs and Ahmed 1974, 8). Using this very
general definition, all literacy programs come under the NFE umbrella except
formal primary education, self-study, and informal family instruction.
The World Bank often preferred investment in primary education instead
of investing in literacy education. This preference rests on assumptions of
budget constraint and a belief that primary education is more cost-effective
than other types of education. Proponents of nonformal basic education have
suggested that nonformal education is a necessary complement to formal
education. Moreover, as Lauglo (2001) notes, the return on investment
through primary schooling (of children) will take longer as compared to
literacy education (of youth and adults). Recent research has found evidence
of impact on of literacy on the following areas:
• Increased mothers’ support for children’s education;
• Empowerment;
• More effective communication (oral as well as written);
• Improved family health;
• More productive livelihoods. (Lauglo 2001, 16)
These areas of impact are complementing earlier research, which depicted
literacy education as a means to “(1) provide education to those for whom
schooling is not a realistic alternative; (2) make new skills and attitudes avail-
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able to the rural poor; (3) circumvent cultural obstacles that prevent some
people from utilizing school effectively; (4) use scarce educational resources
more efficiently; and (5) modify the schooling system itself” (Papagiannis
and Bock 1983, 8).
Access to education can be considered within a neoclassical economic
framework as an investment that has the potential to lift individuals out of
poverty through their increased returns in the labor market. This is the
human capital version of education, heavily emphasized by the World Bank.
The social return on investment, it is claimed, is higher for girls and women
than for boys and men. Education for girls and women will improve pro-
ductivity, cash income, and lead to positive externalities in terms of consumer
behavior, health, family planning, and, to a lesser extent, asset management
and migration (Cohn and Geske 1990). Based on this, “societies may also
want more investments in women, because of the greater social returns (ex-
ternal benefits) accruing from women’s human capital compared to men’s”
(Schultz 1995, 15). In this perspective, the Women’s Literacy Project in Sen-
egal corresponds to a double desire to invest in women’s literacy and at the
same time to build civil society.
Methodology
To understand the functioning of the Women’s Literacy Project in the
context of international aid, it is necessary to study both the policy (of part-
nerships between the state and nongovernmental associations) and its ap-
plication. The historic focus of this article starts in 1993 with the creation of
a Senegalese policy of using NGOs as service providers.3 The geographical
focus of the project is limited to half of Senegal, that is, the provinces of
Dakar, Diourbel, Fatick, Kolda, and Louga. The World Bank project covered
these five provinces, while a Canadian-financed literacy project, using a similar
approach based on NGO service provision, covered the rest of the country.
Both the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) still (as of early 2008) continue the implementation of literacy services
in Senegal, using much the same implementation approach.
To analyze the project, I have triangulated information from three main
sources: documents, quantitative data, and field interviews. The documents
include the World Bank Procedures Manual for civil society’s implementation
of literacy services in Senegal (2000–2002), the project document from the
World Bank, and various World Bank and evaluation documents. The quan-
titative data available on the women’s literacy program include statistics from
the Department for Literacy and Basic Education at the Ministry of Education
(Direction de l’Alphabe´tisation et de l’Education de Base: DAEB); the gov-
3 In Senegal, the approach was called partnership (le partenariat) or, more commonly, faire-faire,
literally “to make do,” indicating that the state “made” the civil society associations “do” something.
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ernment’s Project Coordination Unit (PCU); and the World Bank on yearly
course enrollment, evaluation, and success rates. The data do not usually
take into account the characteristics of new participants who replace partic-
ipants dropping out from the course, so it is difficult to compare enrollment
statistics with final test results. A longitudinal study that started in 2000 and,
over a period of 5 years, investigated 20 providers (covering 60 literacy classes
with a total of 1,500 participants), suffers from the same problems. However,
interviews led me to consider that the profile of the dropouts is roughly the
same as the ones replacing them. I have therefore used quantitative statistics
in the analysis of the project.
During January and February 2004, I made an on-site visit and conducted
52 interviews with project stakeholders from the following categories: civil
servants, consultants and staff of provider associations, as well as former and
current learners.4 The sample was intended to give as broad knowledge as
possible of the case and was therefore stratified, covering all categories of
stakeholders involved in the project. I mostly used open-ended questions,
focusing on four areas: (i) project processes, including questions related to
decentralization, monitoring, and evaluation, selection of providers, and im-
plementation; (ii) project impact, including questions related to literacy,
health, gender issues, and civil society; (iii) project costs, including questions
related to opportunity costs and direct costs; and (iv) background questions,
which were related to the stakeholders’ lives, families, and relations with the
project. The data were subsequently coded, using the same categories.
In addition to this fieldwork, I have had prior exposure to the project as
a consultant for the World Bank, for which I have written two studies related
to the project (Nordtveit 2004a, 2004b). My experiences with the World Bank
gave me the opportunity to examine the establishment and financing of
international education projects from the inside and to explore the under-
lying theories on which the projects are based.
Senegal: The Country Context
Senegal is situated in West Africa, sharing borders with Mauritania, Mali,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and The Gambia. It counted 9.8 million inhabitants
in 2001, with a population that is concentrated in and around the capital
city of Dakar and the center of the country. The country is divided into 11
regions, each of which is subdivided into departments and districts. The basic
community organizational level is that of the village. A village head is the
traditional leader of the community, although the role is based more on long-
established prestige than on administrative duties.
Most village women belong to local women’s associations, which can be
4 I conducted interviews with 14 civil servants; 23 consultants, teachers, and providers; 14 learners;
one person from the contract-managing association; as well as key UNESCO and World Bank staff.
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nonprofit initiatives to organize local social events or legally registered for-
profit groups (GIE) focused on economic activities, such as the production
and sale of peanuts or vegetables. Women’s affiliations with these associations
have both a financial and a social role and may function as a social safety
net or become a means to obtain some financial independence from their
husbands (Kane 2001). As noted above, these associations, whether they are
for-profit or nonprofit, are considered as core examples of Senegal’s civil
society. For practical purposes, there are virtually not any differences between
for-profit or nonprofit associations in their function and ambitions.
The literacy rate in Senegal is very low and can be estimated at 34 percent
after independence in 1960 (Camera and Sow 2003). Currently, about half of
the present Senegalese population has attended school and is by government
standards considered to be literate (Senegalese government 2003). However,
most pupils attend too few years of schooling to become functionally literate.
The World Bank estimates the average years of schooling of adults at 2.6 years
(2000 data), and UNESCO estimates the illiteracy rate at 61 percent (in 2002)
as opposed to 37 percent in sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO 2007).5 These data
situate the literacy rate in Senegal among the lowest in the world. Furthermore,
there is a significant gender gap in both formal school enrollment and attain-
ment; 41 percent of young women in the 15–24 years age group are literate
compared with 59 percent of young men (UNESCO 2007, 2002 data).
Education reforms in 1971 and 1981 aimed at moving national education
from a colonially patterned system to a genuine national system, while at the
same time boosting enrollment and attainment. However, the Senegalese
authorities faced several problems, particularly in terms of planning the ex-
pansion of primary education. The government relied mostly on ad hoc
planning without a clear policy or systematic approach to eradicate literacy:
“faced with a truly endless array of problems, the public authorities decided
back in 1988 to give up the idea of forward planning . . . [and] they adopted
a new credo: to let problems come as they may, and to cope with or adjust
to them as far as momentarily possible, one day at a time” (Sylla 1993, 371).
In this conjuncture of weak government planning and limited resources,
global donors and, in particular, the World Bank became very influential in
Senegal. Some teachers were not pleased with reforms proposed by the World
Bank and disapproved of its increasing influence in the country: “The World
Bank has taken over the bulk of funding for educational projects. Confronted
with a staggering array of urgent problems while World Bank intervention
increases steadily, the State stands open to suspicions that as far as the ed-
ucational system is concerned, it has abdicated its sovereign responsibilities,
and given up the planned management of educational investment and pro-
grammes. Some teachers, accusing the state of dereliction of duty, have taken
5 See http://www.uis.unesco.org/profiles.
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to quipping that henceforth the system should be called the World Bank
School System” (Sylla 1993, 370). This criticism has been reflected by a num-
ber of Senegalese intellectuals, especially those close to the circle of Samir
Amin, director of the Third World Forum in Dakar. For nonformal education,
however, most government officials and civil society associations were positive
toward the World Bank’s intervention, since it led to increased financing of
the sector.
Whereas the government’s management of educational investment in
primary education is weak, it has been almost nonexistent at other levels.
Literacy was claimed to be an official priority in the years after independence,
but no institutions took charge of nonformal education and adult basic ed-
ucation as a particular mandate until 1971, when the Department for Vo-
cational Training at the Secretariat for Youth and Sports was given this re-
sponsibility. Subsequently, the mandate fluctuated between institutions, none
of which had a clear literacy policy or funding to implement literacy programs.
It was not before 1986 that a Department for Literacy and Basic Education
was created. As demonstrated by the low literacy rates in Senegal, the frail
nonformal literacy and basic education structure in Senegal did not do much
to improve literacy rates in the country.
NGOs as Literacy Service Providers
The government traditionally did not have a strong role in implementing
literacy programs. Different NGOs and private companies set up literacy
programs in the 1970s–1990s, most of which were small scale. These initiatives
were often initiatives to fill local, specific needs, not partnerships between
the government and civil society. In 1990, the government, partly as a reaction
to the Jomtien World Conference on Education for All, became preoccupied
with the low literacy rate of the population, which was now seen as an obstacle
to development (Gueye 1999).
A new implementation method was defined during a colloquium in Kolda
in 1993, which had as its central objective to define a national 10-year policy
for literacy. Representatives from various donors, including the World Bank,
were present at Kolda and participated in discussions about the relationship
between the state and civil society. Some disagreement could be seen among
the participants: the World Bank representative wanted to transfer the im-
plementation responsibilities of literacy to a few large nongovernmental or-
ganizations with international recognition, while the Senegalese government,
instead, opted to use many small (and local) civil society associations for
provision of literacy services.
The national government had a triple incentive to use civil society as-
sociations: (i) these associations were already in the field, implementing or
ready to implement literacy classes; (ii) the use of civil society would likely
be a politically popular move to gain NGO support to the government; and
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(iii) it corresponded to international donors’ requirements for using market
mechanisms to select organizations to deliver social services. The adoption
of a policy based on partnership between the government and nongovern-
mental organizations strengthened the influence of external donors, without
really strengthening local NGOs, because the latter became competitors for
finance instead of promoters of a common agenda. At the same time, the
partnership policy kept the government’s authority at the same (low) level
as before: the DAEB had always been a coordinating entity without direct
implementation responsibilities and remained on the sideline of the literacy
scene when it grew exponentially.
The World Bank would probably not have agreed to fund literacy services
until the state had formulated a “fit” project involving nongovernmental
organizations as service deliverers, in that the bank’s project document ex-
plicitly mentioned its concerns about “the specter of the government using
primary education resources [i.e., personnel and budget] for literacy” (World
Bank 1996, 7). The bank did not seem overly preoccupied about the quality
of the services offered but was mostly concerned with procedural aspects of
the implementation. It was believed, as proposed by conservative economic
theory, that delivery based on competition between different providers would
automatically result in the selection of the best possible proposals, thereby
improving literacy standards in the country. The donors assumed that there
were enough providers operating in all parts of Senegal to ensure sustainable
competition and that the government (or a contract-managing company)
would be able to provide low-cost and effective contract enforcement.
Organizing the Women’s Literacy Project
The World Bank and the government decided to use AGETIP [Agence
d’Exce´cution des Travaux d’Inte´reˆt Publique] to manage contracts with pro-
viders; AGETIP was a parastatal contract-managing agency that was set up as
an NGO. It was chosen because it had prior contract-management experience
with infrastructure projects financed by the World Bank and could modify
its infrastructure-related procedures to be used in the literacy sector. These
procedures required the prospective literacy provider association to establish
a “subproject” proposal requesting funding for 10–20 learning centers, each
of which were to enroll about 30 participants. In total, each project enrolled
between 300 and 600 persons at a unit cost of CFAF 37,000 (about US$77)
per enrollee.6 The subproject proposals were first checked for accuracy at
the local level by government staff and were then sent to a selection committee
composed of three government staff (one from the PCU; one from DAEB;
6 Nominal unit costs of the WLP’s “integrated” phase, using an average 2007 conversion rate of
US$1 p CFAF 479.
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and one from the Ministry of Family, Social Action, and National Solidarity),
one representative from civil society, and one from AGETIP.7
After selection, the proposals were sent to the contract-managing agency
(AGETIP), which was responsible for establishing the contracts, paying the
providers, and monitoring their use of the funds. For their parts, the providers
were in charge of the daily follow-up and monitoring of their respective
subprojects. The government was responsible for the subprojects’ overall
technical supervision, which was handled by a project coordination unit
(PCU) in the Ministry of Education (staffed with civil servants but with ad-
ministrative costs and equipment paid for by the World Bank). In addition,
a provider coordination group (CNOAS: Coordination Nationale des Op-
e´rateurs en Alphabe´tisation du Se´ne´gal) was created to represent the pro-
viders’ interests and to help in case of conflict between any of the parties.
The World Bank maintained a close relationship with the PCU but was not
involved in the day-to-day management of the project.
A procedures manual outlined the selection process, defined the duties
of each actor, and explained the procedures the providers needed to follow
to obtain funding. It required the prospective providers to discuss the literacy
course with the villagers, establish a proposal, and submit it for review. Then,
if the prospective provider was selected, it needed to recruit, pay, provide
initial training for staff; upgrade or construct community literacy centers in
each target community; procure equipment; implement the literacy pro-
grams; and monitor and evaluate the services provided.
The literacy courses were of 450 hours’ duration and were complemented
with postliteracy training, income-generating activities (e.g., soap making,
dyeing, vegetable growing, and shopkeeping), and management training for
the leaders of local women’s associations. The courses were not free; to
participate, each learner had to pay CFAF 2,500 (about US$5.2) to the pro-
vider. In most cases, the participants could decide the timetable of the course
and would normally request that the facilitator offer three classes a week,
during the afternoons. They would also decide on one or several topic(s)
for the functional skills training.8 After about 10 months of provider involve-
ment (through the facilitator) in the community, a relais (a participant who
had received special training as a substitute literacy teacher) was supposed
to take over the teaching duties.
Cost-Effectiveness and Wastage in the Women’s Literacy Project
Proponents of nongovernmental organizations as service providers main-
tain that this implementation method boosts both the quantity and the quality
7 The representatives from civil society and the PCU were observers; they did not have voting
power.
8 This decision should in theory be facilitated by the provider, who arrived at a learning topic that
responded to local needs and improved the living condition of the participants.
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of literacy education in comparison to a (hypothetical) literacy program of-
fered by the government. The quantitative increase in enrollment was real,
although there are no comparisons to what government institutions could
have accomplished with the same World Bank resources. The World Bank
and local stakeholders saw the avoidance of heavy up-front investment in
infrastructure as a proof of the cost-effectiveness of the system: the project
could build on existing and start-up provider associations and thereby reduce
infrastructure-related public investment costs.9 Interviewees pointed to the
increased quality of the services provided: whereas previous literacy courses
had limited access to books and learning materials, the investment in such
material was now a part of the PCU-established requirements to access funding.
Again, it may be argued that the improvements in quality were due to the
better funding for literacy services rather than to the use of a better imple-
mentation method.
According to the numbers provided by the World Bank’s completion
document, over a 5-year period more than 200,000 people (of which about
87 percent were female) enrolled in the WLP (World Bank 2004). The DAEB
reported in 2003 that during the preceding 15-year period, over 1 million
persons—or about 10 percent of the entire population in the country—had
been enrolled in NGO-managed literacy projects financed by the World Bank,
the Senegalese government, and CIDA. Most of the civil servants that I in-
terviewed contended that these numbers could not have been reached
through government-led implementation but could have been achieved only
through partnerships with civil society. This was part of a broader discourse,
led by government officials and representatives from many donors, especially
the World Bank, about the need to work in partnership (partenariat) with
NGOs to deliver social services in the country. The broad consent about the
use of NGOs as service providers was due to the use of many small-scale local
NGOs, instead of a few international organizations. Many government officials
and local politicians created NGOs and competed for funds for literacy pro-
vision and thereby became inherent supporters of the system.10
According to government reporting and World Bank data, about 87,000
of the 200,000 enrolled participants learned to read and write (counting 15
percent dropout and 50 percent success at the end exam).11 However, a closer
look at budget reports from the World Bank and reports from the Senegalese
government’s longitudinal studies indicates that the aforementioned num-
bers may paint too optimistic a picture. The World Bank’s cost figures show
that the bank provided payment for enrollment of about 180,000 people (or
9 It was assumed that the government already was using existing school resources at full capacity
and could or should not deploy primary education infrastructure or other resources to the nonformal
sector.
10 Civil servants were not authorized to serve on NGOs. However, interviews indicated that many
government officials set up NGOs anyway, using somebody in the family or a friend as a front person.
11 World Bank data are based on DAEB’s figures.
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TABLE 1
Success Rates of PAPF in 1999 (%)
Literate at Enrollment Literate after Completion Success
Reading 17 52 35
Writing 13 39 26
Problem solving 3 23 20
Functional skills 5 73 68
Average 37
Source.—Based on DAEB 2001–3, 2003.
Note.—PAPF p Projet Alphabe´tisation Priorite´ Femmes (Women’s Literacy Project).
about 30 learners per community literacy course),12 although field visits and
the longitudinal study indicated that most courses enrolled fewer than 30
persons and that the dropout rate, at approximately 34 percent, was much
higher than the officially accepted (and reported) number of 15 percent.
Moreover, if the persons who were literate at the start are not counted
among those succeeding in the course, the results are even less impressive.
For instance, although the Senegalese government’s longitudinal study found
that 52 percent of the evaluated learners (enrolled in WLP in 1999) acquired
the target reading skills, 39 percent learned to write, 23 percent learned
problem solving (functional math), and 73 percent acquired the targeted
functional skills (see table 1, “Literate after Completion”), the same source
indicates that 17 percent of the learners already knew how to read at the
onset of the program, 13 percent could write, 3 percent knew how to solve
mathematical problems, and 5 percent had a sufficient knowledge of func-
tional skills (see table 1, “Literate at Enrollment”). Using these numbers, the
overall success rate (averaged across the differences between the literate-after-
completion and the literate-at-enrollment rates) comes to 37 percent, while
the success rate for literacy and numeracy alone (reading, writing, math
problem solving) is 27 percent.
Considering an estimated enrollment of 180,000 learners and a dropout
rate of 34 percent, only 44,000 learners can be considered successful. The
costs to the government (not including the private costs) of one successful
course completer would therefore be more than US$300. If the functional
skills category is excluded, the number of learners who acquire literacy skills
during the course is less than 18 percent. In other words, the use of NGOs
as service providers in Senegal does not seem particularly cost-effective.
Although the WLP is used as a model in other countries, there are some
indications that the results from Senegal may not compare well internation-
ally. Lauglo, using 14 different literacy cases reviewed by Oxenham and Aoki,
found a median success rate of 60 percent of initially enrolled learners
12 In other words, World Bank authorizations for payments of provider services, approximately 5.22
billion CFAF, divided with unit costs, come to about 180,000 learners. The providers’ payment was based
only on unit costs, and each class had a maximum of 30 learners.
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(Lauglo 2001). Using the same research data, Lauglo reported that the unit
costs ranged from a high of about half of the cost of 1 year of primary
schooling to a low of about one-seventh. In the WLP, the unit cost per enrollee
corresponded to roughly 90 percent of 1 year in primary schooling, whereas
its success rates were much lower than Lauglo’s reported numbers (and also
much lower than the success rates found in primary education). The WLP
thus seems to be exceptionally well funded, but the high funding was ap-
parently not leading to correspondingly positive results.
Why was the WLP relatively cost ineffective? Many interviewees attributed
the lack of results to the low quality of teaching. The providers often cut
costs on the literacy teachers’ training and offered them a crash course (of
about 3 weeks duration) that was too short and of insufficient quality to make
them good teachers. Additionally, books (reading, writing, and math) used
in the programs were often selected by criteria of cost and easy availability.
Both the teaching methods and, in many cases, the books were derived from
primary school curricula and unfit for adolescents and adults.
Moreover, the providers and participants were supposed to build literacy
centers and to set up small village libraries. In many cases, they did a poor
job of constructing and/or maintaining the centers, which were reduced to
shambles soon after the project had ended (or, if it was well built, it was
converted to other uses, such as food storage). Also, the library books were
often distributed to learners or taken back by the provider at the end of a
subproject period. While one could treat each of these as independent con-
tributors to the WLP’s limited cost-effectiveness, it is important to consider
how all of them are linked to the fundamental problem of monopoly and
asymmetric information, leading to providers cutting back on costs (and
program quality) to increase surplus revenues.
Monopolies and Asymmetric Information in the Women’s Literacy Project
The World Bank and the government took for granted that WLP bene-
ficiaries had easy access to the “market” of service providers and could change
provider if they were dissatisfied with services. Also, it was believed that con-
tract information would be readily available to all stakeholders and that the
government (or its designee) would enforce contract compliance. None of
these assumptions appears to have been borne out in this case.
As for asymmetric information, interviews and reports documented the
following problems: the selection procedures were based on evaluation of
the subproject proposal submitted by the prospect provider but failed to take
into account the providers’ past performance. Each selection was constructed
as a one-shot game, and a known “bad” provider could be reselected. In some
cases, the providers did not create the project document themselves but
subcontracted the production of the proposal to a consultant or to another
association. A very poor provider could therefore obtain financing by devel-
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oping or by buying a very good subproject proposal. Consequently, the best
providers were not always selected, and the delivery did not improve because
of competition. A second information-related problem was the inability of
government and project staff to verify the subproject’s statements; for ex-
ample, whether the provider had discussed the subproject with the com-
munity members and whether the latter were interested in receiving a literacy
course.
The intention from the World Bank was that the implementation of a
subproject could generate a small surplus that would be kept by the provider
organization. In theory, the competition between providers would make these
latter spend more money to boost the quality of the courses and thus decrease
the surplus retained. Instead, many providers—both for-profits and non-
profits—tried to earn as much as possible, while competing to make the
nicest-sounding proposals and to implement the subprojects in the most
accessible areas, often enrolling “easy” learners who were already literate.
Since the providers had important financial incentives to set up courses, many
literacy programs were not responding to community demand but to the
providers’ persuasion of villagers to accept the course.13 However, such pro-
vider-driven implementation was in part positive, since the providers in many
cases stimulated local interest for literacy. But it also firmly established pro-
vider monopolies in the communities. The provider “converted” a community
to literacy services, and then the same provider implemented the course. If
the provider association performed badly, the participants had no way of
changing it—their only option was to “vote with their feet” and leave the
course, an action that (as mentioned above) did not hinder the providers’
chances for obtaining future funding.
In principle, the project had designed a monitoring system that would
prevent asymmetric information problems and address monopoly situations
such as the ones described above. Yet, the design failed to take into account
the incentives and disincentives of government agents and the parastatal
contract-managing agency (AGETIP) to perform monitoring and evaluation
work. The project management was dependent on political capability and
seemed to work better when the government was stable and led by capable
managers. New managers often had vested interests in financing civil society
associations and also depended on the votes of the members of these asso-
ciations. The agency could in principle have stepped in and, to a certain
extent, have compensated for the government’s lack of monitoring. However,
it had no incentive to monitor and to stop payments on a contract: the as-
sociation was paid on a pro rata basis (equivalent to 5 percent of the contract
value) and thus mainly had an incentive to ensure quick contract setup and
rapid transfer of funds. As the World Bank (2004, 16) noted, “AGETIP did
13 In some cases the community in which the course was to be set up was not even consulted,
although such consultation was required by the WLP.
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well in managing credit special accounts and ensuring timely disbursements,
but did not do well in supervision and monitoring of the contracts.” The
ineffective monitoring and contract enforcement reduced dramatically the
communities’ ability to change their provider association during implemen-
tation and virtually confirmed the providers’ monopoly situation.
Further information problems appeared in 1999, when the WLP began
to decentralize the selection procedures as well as some of the supervision
and monitoring activities. The decentralization was largely done as a desktop
exercise, without taking into account the institutional, human, and material
resources that were necessary to make it successful. As a result, there was
limited exchange of information between the local and central levels, which
made possible corrupt behavior. For example: (i) local government staff some-
times established provider associations, requested funds for implementing a
subproject, and selected themselves for implementing it; (ii) in some cases
the evaluation officers refused to report a positive evaluation of a subproject
before receiving a “gift” from the provider; and (iii) some education staff
refused to give an implementation authorization to a provider association
that had not “paid its dues” to the local authorities. During interviews, the
providers often cited cases of the two first forms of corrupt behavior, which
seemed to have been quite widespread in the project (interviews with key
informants and World Bank personnel led to the belief that these were wide-
spread problems in all projects in Senegal and not limited to the WLP). The
extent to which such corruption was common in the WLP is not known, but
interviews with stakeholders led to the belief that it was fairly normal and
could have affected as much as half of the subprojects.
In some cases, the corruption of local officials led to a duel between
providers and local authorities. Some providers—for example, international
NGOs or churches—were strong enough to bypass authorities, while many
local provider associations had to comply with the demands for such “gifts”
and “dues.” The corruption in turn reduced the quality of the course (because
of less effective use of funds, some of which had to be used as “gifts” to the
local authorities); it led to ineffective monitoring from the government’s side
and reduced the providers’ funding and incentives to perform well. It had
as a consequence a shrinking trust in the government and thereby further
delegitimization of the state.
Effects of the Women’s Literacy Project on Civil Society
While its impact on literacy was less than hoped for, the WLP did have
an effect on the nature of civil society in Senegal and its relationship to the
state. However, even in this regard, the consequences of the WLP were dif-
ferent than is often projected (and perhaps desired) by social theorists and
representatives of international donor agencies. The number of provider
associations (mostly grassroots for-profit associations) increased, a develop-
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ment that Stiglitz and other theorists see as positive, based on a belief that
a strong civil society improves democratic processes in the country and con-
tributes to economic growth. In the Senegalese case, though, the new civil
society associations became dependent on state funds and were quickly con-
verted toward a pure business function rather that being a control against
corruption and a counterbalance to state power. Instead, the NGOs exerted
pressure on the state for more funding. When the funding ceased, many of
the implementing associations became inactive until they received additional
funding to implement a new subproject.
The World Bank and CIDA provided financial support to create a provider
coordination group, CNOAS. This organization could have represented civil
society and exerted pressure to control the widespread corruption and to
improve the standards for literacy provision. However, CNOAS was not ca-
pable of doing that, nor was it capable of strengthening civil society. Its leaders
were directors of their own associations and were more interested in gen-
erating funding (for these associations) than in creating a strong CNOAS.
The partnership between the government and NGOs thus evolved toward
an uneasy collaboration in which the government and civil society both acted
as opportunists—and where both providers and state agents (by setting up
NGOs in their “spare” time or by asking for “contributions” from the service
providers) could increase profits if they bent the system a little.
At the local level, the participants in the literacy courses were mostly
women organized in women’s associations. The WLP strengthened these
associations through training of their staff members (such leadership training
was a mandatory part of the providers’ duties). Women’s associations in Sen-
egal were often connected with financial networks and had both financial
and social functions. Participation in women’s associations in the combination
with literacy courses helped the participants to achieve more financial au-
tonomy (through participation in credit schemes and through the lessons in
income-generating activities). It also led to creation of networks of trust; for
example, many interviewees said that meetings were used to solve conflicts
among members.
Participating women’s associations obtained a legal status as a result of
the WLP; this was one of the aims of the project. Legal registration enabled
the associations to negotiate development activities (and funding) directly
with national and international development and financial organizations. It
also enabled them to submit proposals—and to receive funding—for imple-
menting literacy projects (or for providing other services). However, the
strengthening of the women’s associations was firmly based in a logic of what
women could do for development (i.e., a WID perspective), instead of crit-
ically evaluating the power structures of the patriarchy. Accordingly, the pro-
ject created an obedient and nonthreatening civil society that would not
question government actions, development goals, or the status quo of society.
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The NGOs involved in the project would rarely if ever challenge underlying
development ideologies or the local patriarchal structures. The project-cre-
ated civil society thus became an implementer that donors, the government,
and the traditional social hierarchy felt comfortable with. In creating this
comfort zone, little attention was paid to the proposed outcome of the project,
that is, literacy, and questions of market failure were hardly addressed at all,
neither by the World Bank, the government, nor project-related structures
such as NGOs, the contract-management agency, or the provider coordina-
tion group.
Conclusion
In this article I contend that some services, especially those for which
there is no easy access to the market for providers and those for which there
are difficulties of ensuring contract compliance (through either long or short
routes of accountability), may not be suitable for privatization. The Women’s
Literacy Project offers several examples of market failure, especially with
regard to asymmetric information. In evaluating whether partnership between
the government and NGOs is an appropriate approach for delivering literacy
services in Senegal and elsewhere, it is useful to look at the intended effects
of the WLP (literacy, strengthening of civil society) and its unintended effects
(sloppy delivery, low quality). As we have seen above, the use of NGOs to
produce literacy led to an extraordinary donor activity and to widespread access
to (mostly) low-quality literacy education for rural women in Senegal. As the
comparison to international cases showed, the WLP was more costly and less
effective than many other literacy courses. Its achievements in developing lit-
eracy skills at the local level were less than was planned or expected.
This project showed that monopoly and contract enforcement problems
(lack of information) led to low-quality service delivery. The limited quality
seems to have had a larger effect on literacy learning than on training for
income-generating activities, maybe because it was easier to find local experts
on dyeing, soap making, and on other practical skills than on literacy. Perhaps
also the learners were more able to control the providers’ contribution in
practical fields, since they knew what soap would look like (whereas it would
be difficult for an illiterate person to imagine what literacy would be like).
When considering whether NGOs should be used to implement literacy
courses, it is important to evaluate the state’s effectiveness in regulating the
sector and its willingness to do so. In Senegal, both the state and AGETIP
were unwilling (and possibly unable) to regulate the sector effectively. Some
of the monopoly and information-related project flaws could have been cor-
rected through a more effective use of “the short route”; that is, by increasing
the clients’ power over providers through the learners’ management of the
funds (making the learners responsible for payments to the providers upon
delivery of satisfactory services rendered). Also, target communities could
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have been preidentified, and representatives from the learner group could
have been involved in the provider selection process. Such steps would have
virtually eliminated the monopoly situation and would have improved con-
tract enforcement. They may also have improved the distribution problems,
namely, that the providers concentrated their activities in zones that are easily
accessible. All these elements are suggested and developed in World Bank
literature on partnerships with NGOs and service provision: one first step in
the right direction would be for the World Bank to adopt these steps in its
own projects. Its failure to do so leads to questions as to whether the use of
NGOs is imposed to boost quality provision of services or if it is an ideological
device to reduce the size of the government and to transfer the latter’s
responsibilities to private associations.
The WLP has shown several examples of how courses set up through
large-scale private provision suffered from the low-quality offer of literacy
services. When considering the use of civil society as implementing agent, it
is important to question what type of civil society one would like to develop
in the country. Is it an “economic” for-profit civil society that is dependent
on state funding, or should it be a civic-oriented civil society promoting a
sound democracy? In WLP, the business aspect was developed, literacy was
set out on the market as a commodity, and nongovernmental organizations
(mostly for-profit associations) were used to provide services. A redesign of
the system could begin by questioning the underlying assumptions of the
project and asking (a) to what extent literacy is a market commodity or a
government responsibility and (b) whether civil society is a mere business
partner in development or an important component of a well-functioning
democracy.
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